tionary and the OED, neither of which distinguishes very well between the meanings of "aphorism," "apophthegm," "maxim," "sentence," and "precept." If it is true that the illustrative passages following the definitions of these terms in the OED suggest that they cannot always be interchanged in context, it is also true that the definition of each employs some or all of the remaining words: "Aphorism" is in part defined as "Any principle or precept expressed in a few words; a short pithy sentence containing a truth of general import"; "Apophthegm," as "a pithy or sententious maxim." Johnson is hardly more helpful: "Aphorism" he defines as "A maxim; a precept contracted in a short sentence; an unconnected proposition." "Apophthegm" he considers to be "A (2) Her analysis of structure, which attempts to take into account all La Rochefoucauld's variations, has so large a number of categories that while it may be useful for reference, it does not give the reader a "sense" for the many forms. (3) Her willingness to venture frequent impressionistic responses perhaps mars the objectivity that characterizes her work at its best; for example, she says, "as one turns the pages of La Rochefoucauld's collection of Maxims, the constantly recurring tonic i is noted quite easily. The high, shrill quality of this vowel seems to translate aptly the author's ironical overtones" (p. 77). Again, "The quick staccato quality of the consonants d, p, k, and t is called up to render the anger, disgust, and sarcasm of the author, the rolling r his rage, the whistling recurrrence of the s his irony, disdain, and scorn, the abrasion of thef and v his disgust, while the softer sounds of 1, m, r rather translate the sweetness, languor, and evasive fluidity of the topic under consideration" (p. 81). The reader of both her study and the present essay will note that the aphoristic feature which I call "polar" Sister Mary had referred to as "binary," "bipartite," or "binomial. But the Empirical school of philosophy gives birth to dogmas more deformed and monstrous than the Sophistical or Rational school. For it has its foundations not in the light of common notations, (which though it be a faint and superficial light, is yet in a manner universal, and has reference to many things,) but in the narrowness and darkness of a few experiments. To those therefore who are daily busied with these experiments, and have infected their imagination with them, such a philosophy seems probable and all but certain; to all men else incredible and vain. Of this there is a notable instance in the alchemists and their dogmas; though it is hardly to be found elsewhere in these times, except perhaps in the philosophy of Gilbert. Nevertheless with regard to philosophies of this kind there is one caution not to be omitted; for I foresee that if ever men are roused by my admonitions to betake themselves seriously to experiment and bid farewell to sophistical doctrines, then indeed through the premature hurry of the understanding to leap or fly to universals and principles of things, great danger may be apprehended from philosophies of this kind; against which evil we ought now to prepare.9 La Rochefoucauld's aphorisms are, of course, much briefer than Bacon's: and, as every reader knows, they contain a paradox, or "turn." Although the Frenchman's literary descendants were highly original aphorists, they were influenced by him in two ways. In the first place, he confined their aphoristic scrutiny largely to man's psychology, rather than to special fields of knowledge-medicine, statecraft, scientific methodas Hippocrates and Bacon earlier had done. In addition he gave them a device of style in his use of paradox, which tempts imitation despite its complexity. It seems probable that in addition to being attracted by the obvious subtlety of these compositions, the would-be imitators were attracted by an equally obvious symmetry. If such was their response, it was accurate. In fact the aphorisms of La Rochefoucauld and his followers employ structural elements to support their meaning in such specific ways that they lend themselves to analysis, which can characterize both the patterns of structure and-more interesting-the kind of cognition stimulated by each of these patterns.
Though few critics have tried to say why, it has often been observed that the form of these aphorisms is unmistakable: Obviously, paradoxical aphorisms rely as much upon the force of style as upon intellectual acuity for their effect. Expository aphorisms, though by no means discursive, present arguments to render their conclusions more acceptable to the reader; in taking some time to make a single point, they attenuate their dogmatism. And because they do not demand the reader's attention as unwaveringly as do the paradoxical, his responsibility to judge seems diminished. Though such judgment may be no less profound than that required by the paradoxical, it is more deliberative. On the other hand, the immediacy and intensity of response to aphorisms like La Rochefoucauld's make them seem incontrovertible. To some extent, this feeling results from their concentration in space and reading time. To a greater extent, the feeling derives from the most obvious effect of paradox-the almost simultaneous destruction and reconstruction of received opinion. This change is wrought by a mischievous selection of contradictory views upon matters the reader has long regarded as settled.
About three-fourths of the paradoxical aphorisms of La Rochefoucauld, Halifax, Swift, Chesterfield, and Shenstone employ one of five distinct polar (grammatically balanced) structures, No matter whether they contain one, two, or three sentences, each of these compositions may be divided into two parts, which are With the classification completed, a three-part thesis can be meaningfully offered. Even though it is complex and, logically, far-reaching, it can be simply expressed: first, both grammatical coordinates in paradoxical aphorisms say the same thing in different ways; more important, it is only in aphorisms of antithesis that the two opposing ideas in the paradox are conveyed severally by each of the two grammatical coordinates (paradox in each of the other four classes is conveyed by unique rhetorical means); most important, the opposing ideas in the paradox of every aphorism say the same thing in one important sense.
The most obvious means of accomplishing the reassertion of meaning peculiar to polarity is to say the same thing twice: in other words, to use the sort of parallel repetition one discovers, for example, in Genesis: And [Issachar] bowed his shoulder to bear, and became a servant unto tribute.
And the arms of his hands were made strong.... Even by the God of thy father who shall help thee; and by the Almighty, who shall bless thee.
It is significant that aphorists avoid this means, without exception! The less obvious meansparallelism (of antithesis, analysis, synthesis), equation, and comparison-involve the psychology of the reader more intensely than does repetition, whose chief effect is heavy inexorability. In the other kinds of polarity the reader experiences nervous response, the disturbance that precedes cognition, frequently in an area of ignorance or in an area walled off by preconception. The force of repetition is mechanical; the force of the other devices of polarity is electric; through their use of paradox, they close the circuit between poles and transform the two into a unique one.
It is a commonplace that opposites like strongweak, love-hate, light-dark, despite the antitheses they represent, are so mutually interdependent for their meanings that while the analytical functions of mind distinguish them, the emotional functions associate them. "Odi et amo" says Catullus, speaking for himself as a lover, and suggesting that in the "opposites" of love and hate there is, in addition to analytical polarity, emotional association, perhaps congruence. La Rochefoucauld and Shenstone make similar observations. Both of these compositions assert the psychological basis for all paradoxical aphorisms, for they implicitly allow that paradox may join as well as distinguish "opposites," a readily demonstrable phenomenon.
Les passions en engendrent

Harold E. Pagliaro
Two views are suggested by Shenstone's aphorism "There is no word in the Latin language that signifies a female friend. 'Amrnica' means a mistress: and perhaps there is no friendship betwixt the sexes wholly disunited from a degree of love" (Shenstone, p. 171). The views are that sexual love on the one hand must have, on the other, need not have, a part in a relationship between the sexes. It is likely that most people hold both opinions simultaneously, but without consciousness of the logical contradiction. The aphorism disturbs this double view, ostensibly by rejecting one. Actually, what it does, however, is to require the reader to redefine "mistress": before the experience of the aphorism, a mistress is a woman with whom one enjoys a liaison: after the aphorism, any woman a man likes is a potential mistress. Further, the aphorism implicitly urges the reader to reconsider and discover love as an ingredient of every friendship he has enjoyed with a woman. In effect this paradox blurs the workaday distinction between women who are mistresses and women who are not by encouraging the appraisal of man's feelings about all women of his acquaintance as opposed to his experience with particular women.
In La Rochefoucauld's "La plupart des honnetes femmes sont des tresors caches qui ne sont en surete que parce qu'on ne les cherche pas" (La Rochefoucauld, p. 106) the paradox constitutes redefinition of a word, "virtue." "Honnetes femmes" suggests that chastity is a moral absolute, but with the addition of the second clause, chastity becomes more nearly a product of circumstance. In implying its paradox, the aphorism does not choose between extremes: instead, it tempers one with the other. In short, the elements of paradox in these aphorisms are contradictory only at the most ordinary level of apprehension, only in a realm in which a mistress is simply a mistress, virtue simply virtue. Their actual function is to redefine terms about which there are misconceptions and preconceptions, to remove the insulation of prejudice from words to which faulty or circumscribed meanings attach.
One might suppose that only aphorisms employing the parallelism of antithesis could rely on such fusing opposition. Swift's "Every Man desires to live long: but no Man would be old" plays on an obvious contradiction between the desire for longevity and the dislike of old age, which inevitably attends it. And indeed this class presents its paradox in the most straightforward possible way. The first polar element contains the first part of the paradox, and the second element, the second. One may observe this simple The inferred paradox: The dissimulation of a fool is so clumsy as to be readily observed and countered; the dissimulation of a fool is so unlooked for as to be dangerous.
La fidelite qui parait en la plupart des hommes n'est qu'une invention de l'amour-propre pour attirer la confiance; c'est un moyen de nous elever au-dessus des autres et de nous rendre depositaires des choses les plus importantes. (La Rochefoucauld, p. 91)
The inferred paradox: Loyalty is a virtue practiced for its own sake; loyalty is a means of securing both the good will of others and a good opinion of ourselves.
Examples of Synthesis
There is no word in the Latin language that signifies a female friend. "Arnica" means a mistress: and perhaps there is no friendship betwixt the sexes wholly disunited from a degree of love. Because most aphorisms present judgments about human psychology based on general experience, knowledgeable readers will have available to them the evidence adduced by many of these analytical and synthesizing forms. When such a reader sees the evidence isolated from other data and arranged for argument (as in step one of aphorisms of synthesis), he can often infer step two, a generalization very like the aphorist's; and the same reader, after seeing the generalization (as in step one of aphorisms of analysis), may search his own mind for heretofore unselected but available data that will make up step two. When Shenstone says that "Poets seem to have fame in lieu of most temporal advantages," he makes a statement the reader regards as true-even before finishing the aphorism-if he can discover evidence in his own experience to support it.
But to grasp the fundamental effect of these types, one requires an important corollary of this mutual potentiality for derivation between their parallel members: if it is true that each such member contains a different form of the idea found in both, then each must in its own way imply the entire aphoristic paradox! One may wonder why the writer does not then content himself with a non-parallel aphorism of one member. Sometimes he does.12 But more often parallelism is employed to offer another tier of illumination, a second order of paradox reinforcing the first. In fact, such aphorisms make an almost simultaneous appeal to both the inductive and deductive reasoning faculties. Deduction of course moves slowly, point by point, from the known whole to its separated parts; induction, considered as a process of thought rather than as a method of investigation, is less consciously controlled. It sweeps through myriads of data, selecting the pertinent, and, in some way unknown to consciousness, synthesizes the parts into a newly created whole. Although it can be deliberate, the most measured inductive investigation requires that final leap. Conducted along the doublelevelled route, a close reader of analytical and synthesizing aphorisms cannot avoid both deductive and inductive cognition of the single truth they contain.
The effects of structure in aphorisms of equation and comparison are also unique. The basis of meaning in such compositions is the illogical discovery of "similitude in dissimilitude," to use Wordsworth's appropriate paradox. Whether the form makes use of metaphor (equation) or simile (comparison) the means by which the paradox is produced are markedly alike, if not the same. Instead of stimulating an initial opposition and 12 Swift, for example, writes, "No wise man ever wished to be younger." Although the aphorism does not contain parallel elements, a paradox may be readily inferred from it: Men prefer youth to old age; men (wise men) do not prefer to youth old age; its purpose, of course, is to modify the meaning of "wise men" through the denial of received opinion that it is better to be young than old. The paradox itself results from the tension between the standard definition, which remains unstated, and the figurative one asserted by the aphorist; its effect is achieved as the metaphoric truth displaces (at least modifies) the literal in the mind of the reader. It is worth observing that the everyday definition, though unexpressed, is in a very real sense brought to the attention of the reader. For he seeks it out and clings to it if his imagination is made uncomfortable as it comes to grips with the aphoristic; or if he quickly accepts the metaphor, part of its meaning will derive from the nature and degree of its deviation from the standard definition. In either case both elements of the paradox are available to him. In what sense then are the two definitions (elements of paradox) the same? Simply in this. The standard definition can never again be wholly accepted; it must afterwards partake of the metaphoric. On the other hand the standard is obviously grounded in palpable reality and can never be entirely forsaken. Each then is tempered by the other, and they become one.
Obviously, aphorisms have a special rhetorical and psychological unity. Their effects vary from class to class, but each one contains two components that must join to complete its meaning. The nature of the relationship so far found to exist between these two parts suggests that their order may be reversed without robbing the aphorism of its power. Curiously enough one has the opposite impression as he reads, and indeed the elements up to the very last seem somehow less important than the final one. A man who tells nothing, or who tells all, will equally have nothing told him. (Chesterfield, p. 1998) In what appears to be the delayed revelation of "will equally have nothing told him" there seems an additional charge. But the circuit is closed only because the second pole is joined to the first, not because it was joined in a preferred sequence. Here are typical aphorisms, and they all sustain the illusion that last place is "best." The first thought carrieth a fool without the reply of a second; he hath no dialogue within himself.
Weak and insipid white-wine makes at length a figure in vinegar just as a poet that fails in writing often becomes a morose critic.
We are pleased with very few words spoken by a parrot, just as we value a very little wit in women.
A way of half confessing is explaining.
Clearly, the important idea is not presented terminally, nor is a merely intellectual resolution contained in the final element. The reversibility of the order of polar elements commands the inference that before the conflict of paradox can be generated, both must be given or implied; hence, the reader experiences the sense of completion when he finishes the second polar element, whether it occurs in the original or in inverted order. Furthermore, meaning here is achieved not only as a result of the logical relationship between the elements, in which sequence would play an important part, but also (principally) as a result of the psychological association of contraries or opposites.
Men have two minds, one known to themselves and one unknown or only slightly known. With no obvious difficulty, they can often live as if only the known one existed, and as a result, their vision is limited to a perception of the ordinary, the thin life that parades in Plato's cave of shadows. How to shock or coax them into clearing a passageway from that comfortable known
